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CONGLOMERATES: A BUSINESSMAN'$ VIEW
HAROLD S. GENEEN*
The essential question within the context of the conglomerate phe-
nomenon is whether the Government will continue to allow "meaningful"
new competition to flourish within our free enterprise system. By "mean-
ingful" I mean adequate and frequent enough new entry into established
industries to provide rapid, broad, and effective additions of competition
on a scale which will provide economies to the consumer and strength to
the economy.
There is an impression in the business community that a large-scale
offensive war has been declared on American business growth, business
change and business -diversification. If this offensive war has indeed been
launched, then it has been done without all of the facts, without meaningful
and impartially interpreted data, and without consideration of the serious
consequences. For example, the recently issued Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Report on Corporate Mergers' is a classic example of basically unsup-
ported hypotheses and theory. Even critics of diversified or conglomerate
companies concede many virtues to diversification and to diversification
mergers. Yet, the FTC Report does not recognize one valuable contribution
of these diversified companies, whether old or new. This is hardly the ob-
jective approach that is needed. And because this FTC Report is a gov-
ernment-sponsored project, there can be little question of why business has
this impression.
In fact, in presenting this report to the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, Professor Mueller called for immediate action to
curtail diversification of American business.
As I balance the costs of inaction, a policy of wait and see, against the
costs of action that subsequent scientific inquiry might prove to be a too
zealous policy, I choose the latter course without hesitation or reservation.
For in the present circumstance, should a bold course of action prove
later to have prevented some increases in economic efficiency, the matter
can be righted by changing policy. 2
However, despite this recommendation, the FTC Report presented no ev-
idence demonstrating that diversified companies or diversification mergers
actually have an unfavorable effect on competition or the economy. Pro-
fessor Mueller's statement is therefore a demand for sentence first, verdict
afterward, and then, a belated inquiry into the facts, because, per chance,
there may be some loss of economic efficiency. On this basis any policy (how-
ever damaging to the economy) could be justified, since it could later "be
righted by changing policy."
* Chairman and President, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.
1 BUREAU OF ECONOMIcs, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969) [here-
inafter cited as FTC REPORT].
2 Statement of Dr. Willard F. Mueller (formerly Chief Economist, FTC), U. of Wis-
consin, Madison, Nov. 4, 1969.
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What has happened, in my opinion, is that the critics are creating a
smoke screen of confusion in order to compensate for the lack of any real
information. Confusion arises in the first place from the impression that the
issue for public debate is whether conglomerate companies should be per-
mitted to diversify through merger. The real issue, however, is whether any
company, young or old, should be allowed to diversify into fields unrelated
to its traditional industry position, and by so doing, add competition the
economy would not otherwise enjoy.
While there has been much said and written on the point that it is
better to stimulate internal growth of competition in new fields, let me state
clearly that, as a matter of business judgment, in virtually all situations of
real diversification into unrelated business, this is both impractical and
uneconomic. It is far better that everyone concerned should know and
understand this, for decisions based on erroneous assumptions are invariably
incorrect.
Companies can, perhaps, move through internal growth into an in-
dustry which is very similar in technology, production know-how and
marketing to the company's existing operations. But in real product diver-
sification situations, new entry innovations and growth in production
capacity can be accomplished only through acquisition of a reasonably
sized company already in that field.
There has been some acknowledgement of this fact even by the Justice
Department, which has recognized the need for "foothold acquisitions" as
a necessary nucleus of this entry process. Unfortunately, there have been no
official guidelines published on this point, and it is our general impression
that the word "foothold" will in practice be thought of as a size so small
that it will not provide a viable base for the kind of modern management
systems and business techniques that a diversified company such as ours
can apply in attempting to improve efficiencies and provide meaningful
competition.
Therefore, while it is clear that the Department of Justice agrees in
principle with the need for diversification mergers, it is unwilling to follow
where its own logic would lead in order to encourage really meaningful
competition. Simply stated, a policy denying access to change, innovations
and new industrial competition by the route of diversification acquisitions
of meaningful size, will result in a stagnant status-quo of the existing large
companies within an industry - regardless of efficiency, competitiveness or
the resulting values offered to the consumer. It prevents the functioning
of a market in corporate assets, thereby lowering the efficiency of the in-
dustry. In short, it prevents the natural transfer of assets to more efficient
managements and deprives stockholders of the real value of their invest-
ments.
It is precisely for these reasons that many informed people have con-
cluded that recent trends of our antitrust enforcement with respect to large
diversification mergers are, perhaps unintentionally, preventing new and
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increased innovation, and are operating to protect industry incumbents
from new competition.
An examination of the top 200 or top 500 companies, or even the top
1000 companies, will disclose that an overwhelming proportion of the so-
called old line companies are already widely diversified into numerous in-
dustries. This is not really a new development, a new trend, or an unusual
situation. In fact, it is clear from general published information that most
companies, large or small, are, to varying degrees, already diversified - and
to use another word -at least partly conglomerate. This fact is readily
apparent from the FTC Report itself.
Although diversification has many merits from the standpoint of the
nation, the consumer, and the stockholder, there persists an emotional belief
that diversified companies are unable to operate in more than one field of
business. Overlooked is the fact that such a company has numerous in-
dividual specialists and experienced managers in many fields, and that the
very untraditional outlook such a company brings to an industry is the
key to innovation and new progress. Diversification provides a form of
security and insurance, as well as a method of adapting to the quickening
tempo of change that we are all experiencing - change in technology,
change in markets and consumers, and change in foreign competition.
It therefore underlies continuity of employment and unity of corporate
effort - it is a constructive influence on our economy. It is a vital necessity
to management concerned with the long-term future of its employees, its
stockholders, and the communities in which it operates. Diversification is,
in short, an "insurance" policy for orderly future growth, and thus has im-
portant positive values as a concept in itself.
This does not mean that a diversified company is not responsive to
each of the markets in which it operates, or can be indifferent to its profit or
loss there. But a diversified company is able to ride out the occasional and
unforeseen vicissitudes of a particular market, depending instead on the
long-term profit opportunities there. It is for this reason that communities
welcome the new plants of a diversified company -plants which are less
likely to be shut down because of a short-term hardship or a fortuitous
change in the market.
It is for sound reasons such as these - constructive reasons - that we
see most of industry, large and small, either already diversified or becoming
more diversified. Factually then, what we really have are only "old" or
"new" diversified companies - or conglomerates. But just as we have always
recognized "well-managed" - or "less well-managed" - companies, so too
do we have "well-managed" or "less well-managed" conglomerate or diver-
sified companies. And both the investor and marketplace have always recog-
nized this difference - and have usually rewarded it in kind by valuation
and stockholder investment action. This corrective factor can be relied
upon; inefficient companies must change and become efficient, or they will
wither away.
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Therefore, the form and structure of diversification should not be con-
fused with the problem of individual company management. American in-
dustry, in fact, provides far more examples of successful diversified com-
panies - old and new - than it does of "unsuccessful" ones. This large
group of successful diversified companies should not be lumped together
with the few less well-managed ones. Indeed, it is important to remember,
that one must consider the value of diversification itself, and not the history
of a few particular managements - each of which will differ in methods
and performance, as well as in the magnitude of the problems they had to
face in their particular industries.
"THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE"
It is argued that conglomerates and other acquisition-minded companies
destroy communities - that in some manner they destroy the American
Way of Life. In recent days, the Justice Department has issued statements
emphasizing that this is the evil they are seeking to eliminate. You will
recall the charge of emasculating the community by moving the decision
power of a company elsewhere - the changing of the community to what
I think was called a "branch store community."
While I cannot speak for progress, let me note that a great many of
the New England mills that shut down did so because of something that
happened within that town - and not away in some other city. It was
because their managements fell behind the times, and while people speak
with concern about the number one man in the town who becomes a
number "x" man in a larger company, no one mentions the hierarchy of
the sons of forebearers who succeeded to the presidency in spite of their in-
competence. I can think of a community in New Hampshire that I am
familiar with- a community that lived off the town plant. Successions of
bad management, mostly oriented to the original family, drove everyone
with managerial competence out of the company, destroying the mill and
the town with it. Maybe a little "branch office" community, which today
would be competitive and thriving, would not have been so bad, at that.
But to be fair, is that what the antitrust laws are supposed to prevent? No,
it is not. Constructive competition by companies like ITT, with good
managements and with branches that do grow, is supposed to take care of
that.
The fact remains that diversified companies are constantly seeking
good communities in which to build plants and companies-just as good
communities are seeking diversified industry. Our operating units which
are responsible for the location of their new plants are colstantly seeking
new area communities. And ITT's operating units receive scores of visits in
the course of a year from representatives of villages, towns, cities and states
who are interested in having ITT operations in their communities. One
of the greatest trends of constructive economy and social uplift that has
been seen in this country (far more effective than any local government
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could achieve) has been the vast number of plants that have been built in
small towns throughout the newer and less developed areas of the country.
Far from detracting from community growth, they have added greatly to
it. In this respect, large and diversified companies have been fluid and re-
sponsive, providing employment and continued community support.
It is against this background that I would like to discuss ITT and its
contribution to the economic and competitive stream of our economy.
DIVERSIFICATION: ITT's OBJECTIVES
The basic purposes and goals of ITT's diversification efforts are in-
tended for the long-term protection and profit of its family of shareholders.
We believe the purposes of such diversification are highly important to
long-term stability, as well as to growth. Business is facing an increasingly
fast-paced technical obsolescence trend, as well as increasing international
competition, which is based on world economies of low labor costs and the
constantly increasing technical capabilities within these low labor cost areas.
Diversification and the consequent development of broad professional man-
agement skills are a necessity for protection and future development. Diver-
sification is therefore a necessary type of corporate insurance which sound
management must achieve on behalf of its stockholders, so that the risks of
separate sectors are pooled and the alternatives of internal fiscal investment
are provided.
The purposes of diversification in our case can be summarized as
follows:
(1) To diversify into industries and markets which have good prospects
for above-average long-term growth and profitability;
(2) To achieve a sound balance between foreign and domestic earnings;
(3) To achieve a sound balance between high risk, capital-intensive
manufacturing operations and less risky service operations;
(4) To achieve a sound balance between high risk engineering-labor-
intensive electronics manufacturing and less risky commercial and
industrial manufacturing;
(5) To achieve a sound ratio between commercial-industrial products
and services and consumer products and services;
(6) To achieve a sound ratio between government-defense-space oper-
ations and commercial-industrial-consumer products and services
in both foreign and domestic markets; and
(7) To achieve a sound balance between cyclical products and services.
Those are our motives and our purposes. They are designed to provide
both growth and security for our employees and stockholders.
DIVERSIFICATION: ITT's METHODS
There are many kinds of diversified companies- or "conglomerates."
There are the old, respectable diversified companies, and there are new
diversified companies. There are also different degrees of product and
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market diversification. Most significantly, there are differences in manage-
ment forms and techniques. Some differ in emphasis on operations versus,
let us say, simple financial management. Others may be engaged primarily
in securities promotion. In making acquisitions, some companies use straight
equity securities, while others use warrants, debentures, installment pay-
ments and deferred pricing. There are friendly mergers, as well as hostile
tenders and proxy fights; there are examples of both retained and replaced
managements. There are resulting efficient companies and there are result-
ing relatively inefficient companies. Unfortunately, all of these differences
are being indistinguishably merged into the generic term "conglomerate"
which is now being widely and confusedly used. But the important fact
is that each company is a different company. For example, diversified or
conglomerate companies divide in one essential area. This point of division
is whether they operate as a financial holding company or as a coherent
operating company; that is, whether they provide within the parent com-
pany a broad group of central management skills, applicable not only to
the overall corporate areas such as financing, law, and stockholder relations,
but also to the operating areas of the company, such as production, market-
ing, planning, research and development, product development, and foreign
operations.
ITT operates as a coherent operating company with a substantial cen-
tral operating management. In fact, we have slightly over 1,000 industrial
and operational specialists in our central management group. We have
developed this expert group in order to improve both our competitiveness
and our efficiencies, and to support our operating companies in improving
operations in those fields, either new or old, which we have entered.
Again, acquisition policies are not the same for all diversified or con-
glomerate companies. The "pro" and "con" of the legal methods used and
the economic justification of even "hostile tenders" have been well-aired
in the literature. Let me state - for the record - that we have never made a
hostile tender.
Let me point out, instead, the management and business value of
friendly acquisitions. With the central management capabilities that ITT
has assembled, we can provide receptive and constructive bases for merger
-bases that will result in increased efficiency for both parties. For ex-
ample:
1. We offer an assurance of continued support and growth in an
innovative climate, leading to new products and fields through our in-
formed management support of such a company.
2. We offer a concerned, helpful, and invigorating management atmo-
sphere in which the new management members can grow. Opportunities
for advancement are created within such an environment; and since these
mergers are arrived at with the concurrence of management and stock-
holders, there is a "mutual accord" on improved objectives from the very
start.
CONGLOMERATES: A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW
3. We can afford to price fairly and to exchange our own equity stocks
with the shareholders of an incoming company. We can improve operating
efficiencies and profits sufficiently to make this valuation worthwhile to
both sets of shareholders. By exchanging equity stocks, the shareholders
of the original company continue as equity participants in the family of
ITT shareholders. We have used no unusual financial packages to support
our growth.
It is significant, therefore, that many of the allegations leveled against
a few conglomerates are simply not applicable to us or to the vast majority
of diversified companies. These methods and the economic results brought
about by the diversified companies such as ITT are thoroughly pro-com-
petitive, pro-growth, and in the national interest. Other allegations which
have been leveled against conglomerates include: reciprocity, concentration
of power, questionable economic performance of acquired companies, pred-
atory pricing, and finally, the allegation that the decision-making process
is removed from the acquired company to the corporate headquarters of
the conglomerate.
In considering each of these allegations, I think it well to define the
starting place. ITT, like all companies, is in business to earn a fair profit,
commensurate with its competitive performance and in full compliance with
the law and the responsibilities of good corporate citizenship. We cannot
afford to do otherwise.
REcIPROCITY
Efforts to purchase or sell goods or services on the basis of "reciprocity"
violate a basic management principle, i.e., building a business soundly and
permanently by being at all times capable of meeting open competition,
and by having a trained business organization capable of meeting the chal-
lenges and problems created by competition. Only in this manner can a
secure foundation and future be developed and built for a company. The
theory of "reciprocity" is therefore repugnant as a basic business philosophy.
Furthermore, it is my firm belief that efforts to purchase or sell goods or
services on the basis of so-called "reciprocity" are completely uneconomical
and are, in fact, a very unsound business practice. Such a practice dulls
and distorts the efforts of both sales and purchasing staffs, dilutes the man-
agement responsibility for profits, and, in the long run, is certain to be
costly and enervating to any company that practices it.
I am, of course, aware that there has been considerable talk during
recent years about "reciprocity," and that in some companies, certain people
have endeavored to create for themselves an executive-level career as a
"Trade Relations" director. However, it is my opinion, based upon my 44
years of business experience in a rather wide variety of companies, that
reciprocal buying and selling "gains" are largely illusory -and are more
often "talked about" or "claimed" by self-serving Trade Relations directors,
than ever realized on any significant scale. In addition, I have observed that
salesmen, who must often have some excuse for losing a sale, may blame
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their failure on what they think they see as reciprocity - where none in
fact exists.
Most importantly, within ITT the very structure of our organization
and the very wide variety of our products and markets create the necessity
for a "profit center" organization in which it is simply impractical to at-
tempt to practice reciprocity.
Profit Centers
The structure and organization of each ITT operating unit is a separate
"profit center" having its own decentralized purchasing department and its
own decentralized sales department. This structure effectively eliminates the
motive, as well as any practical opportunity, for any attempt to utilize the
volume of purchasing activities of one ITT profit center to benefit the sales
activities of another. Since the professional reputation, compensation and,
most importantly, the business career progress of the manager and manage-
ment of each ITT profit center are dependent upon their record of per-
formance (as shown by their own individual profit center), it is clear that
these local managements have the strongest possible professional and career
motivation to achieve maximum efficiencies in their own purchasing depart-
ment. Consequently, they would not only strenuously resist any possible
attempt to interfere with the efficiencies of their own purchasing depart-
ments for any claimed reciprocal benefit to any other profit center, but
would consider this as a restraint on their own professional careers. In this
day of shortage of executives and unlimited outside career opportunities, no
company could afford to alienate its management by affecting their careers
in this manner. Moreover, this would be alien to the entire philosophy of
performance and efficiency, which is the very basis of ITT's whole manage-
ment approach.
The practical situation, and the ITT management attitude, is best il-
lustrated by the fact that ITT does not even waste the time or energy to
accumulate the purchasing and sales data which would be necessary for
"reciprocity" or "reciprocity effect." When the Department of Justice has on
several recent occasions asked ITT to accumulate this data for the Depart-
ment's current investigation, it has been necessary for us to send out special
questionnaires to each of the local profit centers, and then specifically to
assemble and compile the data to answer the Department's questions. This
task was accomplished only after considerable effort and, I might add, com-
plaining by the local purchasing departments about the tremendous waste
of their valuable time in assembling, what they considered, useless data.
And even the data assembled for the Department will rapidly become ob-
solete. The reluctance of our local managements and purchasing agents to
spend their time in assembling such data further illustrates the complete
lack of application of such information in our business operations and the
lack of any significance to any allegation of "reciprocity" or "reciprocity
effect." I might add that as a matter of corporate policy, when we first as-
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sembled this type of purchasing information for the Department of Justice
in 1966, we established procedures for the careful protection of the resulting
list of large suppliers in order to ensure that it was limited to purchasing
and legal channels, and was not made available to the ITT personnel re-
sponsible for sales or marketing. At the same time, in order to ensure that
ITT's corporate policy against reciprocity was fully and clearly understood
throughout the System, we issued a formal ITT Company Policy stating as
follows:
Reciprocity
The United States Supreme Court has held that reciprocal buying prac-
tices or "reciprocity," is "one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices"
at which the antitrust laws of the United States are aimed. Reciprocity
is also an unsound business practice, since it distorts the market process
and the normal development of economic efficiencies and product im-
provements. Consequently, for both legal and business reasons, it is the
policy of ITT to purchase and sell products and services on the basis of
the commercial criteria of superior quality, suitability, efficiency, service,
and price.
No attempt shall be made to develop sales of any service or product
through the use of, or threatened withdrawal of, any existing or potential
reciprocal buying leverage or "reciprocity."
In this connection, information concerning ITT System purchases
from particular suppliers shall not be made available to personnel who
are concerned with developing sales and marketing.
This policy is still in effect, and we have recently taken extra steps to ensure
that all ITT System purchasing and sales personnel are familiar with it.
CONCENTRATION OF POWER
Concentration of power is perhaps the subject that is the most mis-
understood of any concerning the so-called conglomerate or diversified
company. The problem is one of inadequate statistics and of misinter-
pretation. In the FTC Report, for example, it is stated that merger move-
ments around the turn of the century and in the 1920's "left an indelible
imprint on the structure of the American economy," and resulted in "an
increase in market concentration. ' 4 This subject of "market concentration"
is, in fact, the only real economic issue. Market concentration does have a
bearing on competition because competition or monopoly can only exist
in some particular market. The voluminous FTC Report is a massive
evasion of the real need for careful and objective analysis of market con-
centration. The reason so much time is spent in the FTC Report on the ir-
relevancy of "aggregate" or "overall concentration" or "super concentration"
is simply to distract the reader's attention from a very important fact. The
figures on market concentration have been so "unobliging" as to have shown
no increase since World War II (and since long before then). Indeed, there
3 FTC REPORT at 30, 33.
41d. at 33-34.
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may possibly be some tendency the other way. That is why the FTC Report
says very little on the key issue of "market-concentration" and, in fact, pro-
vides us with only some very questionable statistics and conclusions - and
some truncated comparisons. 5
5 For example, in the FTC Report at 214, the statement is made that in industries of
high concentration, i.e., where the four leading companies did over 75 percent of total
shipments, companies among the 200 largest did 87 percent of the business. In contrast,
the largest corporations made only 14 percent of all shipments in industries with four-firm
concentration under 25 percent. It takes some reflection before we realize how meaningless
these two statements are. In an industry where the four leading companies make at least
75 percent of the sales, one would expect large companies in it to do about 87 percent of
the business, and so they do. And in industries where concentration is very low, the par-
ticipating companies, be they large or small, will do only a small percent of the business.
Much more objectionable is Table 4-1. This is summarized at 216:
For example, in 1958, 43 companies were among the four leading sellers in four
or more industries; by 1963, there were 70. On the other hand, five companies in
1958 were leaders in no industries, and 18 were among the leaders in only one.
By 1963, all of the 100 largest companies were among the top four sellers in at
least one industry. In the short period of five years, the top 100 companies had
greatly expanded their positions of leadership. Quite clearly then, the 100 largest
companies have increased not only their share of total manufacturing but also
their power-base.
The first thing to note is that the reference to "industries" is incorrect. It is the so-
called 4-digit product groups which are referred to. If the increase is significant of an
increased "power-base," then surely a decrease would have the contrary significance. If
one examines the original source of Table 4-1, one finds that for the 5-digit products,
which are generally closer to market realities, there is no such trend, or even one to the
contrary. That is, 84 companies were among the four leading sellers in four or more
product groups in 1958, while in 1963 the number was actually down to 82. In the short
period of five years, the top hundred companies had, if anything, somewhat retrogressed.
What the FTC Report did was simply to cut out one-half of the table in its source in
order to produce a picture to support its argument.
The FTC Report itself shows that in 213 industries there was a decrease in con-
centration among producer-goods industries, and an increase among consumer goods.
What it does not indicate is that if we take all 213 industries as a group, weight the
concentration ratio in each industry by its economic importance, value added by manu-
facturer, we find that the average was virtually unchanged for the five-year period. But
this sample of 213 industries comprises only about half of all census industries, which
number about 440. Significantly, there was no attempt to show the weighted average for
all industries in order to measure the industry concentration weighted average. The 213
comparable industries were those where product and industry definitions had not changed.
They were therefore the least dynamic of the 440 industries. Hence, they were not a rep-
resentative sample but a biased sample. There was no attempt to cover the whole range
of industries.
For many years, there have been similar calculations of "aggregate concentration" and
its alleged increase, along with prophecies that in a few decades the largest companies
would take over the whole industrial economy. A well-known book written in 1932 by A.
Berle and G. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, predicted that be-
tween 70 percent and 85 percent of all industrial activity would be in the hands of the
200 largest corporations by 1950, and indeed said that within 30 to 40 years practically
all industrial activity would be "absorbed by 200 giant companies," i.e., by 1960 or 1970.
Id. at 40-41. There has been no such swallowing up of the economy, but this does not
prevent other people from making predictions of doom. I believe Professor Mueller himself
made such a prediction seven or more years ago. He was wrong then, as he is now.
Also interesting is Figure 5-2, which shows the years 1952-1952 as nonactive merger
periods. But in 1947 and 1948 the Federal Trade Commission published two reports on
"The Merger Movement" which added more apocalyptic prophecies: that this country
would go down the road to Socialism, if the allegedly rapid merger movement was not
reversed. FTC, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SumMARY REPORT (1948); FTC, THE REcENT
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Moreover, there is serious "blurring" of the statistics as used. For ex-
ample, there is no distinction made between a company such as ITT, which
TREND OF MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS (1947). Years later, the truth is out; the FTC Report
now shows that the 1932-1952 period was actually an unusually low merger period.
We cannot insist too strongly on this basic point: that "aggregate concentration" has
simply nothing whatever to do with concentration in any given market. Nor has any
change in aggregate concentration any relation to it. In theory, "aggregate concentration"
could increase even when market concentration was decreasing in every single industry.
In fact, such increase as there seems to have been in "aggregate concentration" has co-
incided with stability in industry or market concentration. "Aggregate concentration"
would only have meaning if it were at far higher levels than is even dreamed of now,
in other words, if say five large corporations accounted for all manufacturing, there could
then be no more than five sellers in each individual industry, and perhaps only one in
each. But as the Census Bureau statistics show, the largest hundred companies in 1966
accounted for only 33 percent of the value added in manufacturing. If this were true in
every industry, that the largest hundred companies among them accounted for only one-
third of value added, then American industries would be far less concentrated than they
are today. Few, if any, industries would show so low a degree of concentration.
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Distribution of the 100 Largest Companies According to the Number of Product Classes
and Product Groups in Which Each is I of the 4 Leading Producers, 1963 and 1958.
(Number of Companies)
Companies
Companies according to the number 4-digit 5-digit
of product classes or groups in which product product
they are the leading producers groups classes
All companies ........ 1963 100 100
1958 100 100
Companies among leading
4 producers in-
20 or more product classes
or groups ...................... 1963 3 10
1958 2 10
15 to 19 product classes
or groups ...................... 1963 1 11
1958 1 8
10 to 14 product classes
or groups ..................... 1963 13 22
1958, 4 26
7 to 9 product classes
or groups ...................... 1963 21 20
1958 14 14
4 to 6 product classes
or groups ...................... 1963 32 19
1958 22 24
2 or 3 product classes
or groups ...................... 1963 23 13
1958 34 11
only 1 product class
or group ...................... 1963 7 5
1958 18 4
no product class
or group ...................... 1963 0 0
1958 5 1
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
has about $4 billion in sales and revenues (about 50 percent outside the
United States and spread thinly over some 35 industries) and on this basis
is ranked as the 11 th largest United States industrial firm, and the company
which is ranked 12th- Western Electric- which also does $4 billion, but
entirely in the United States and all concentrated in one industry.
Nor for that matter do the FTC statistics adequately distinguish between
manufacturing activities as contrasted to service activities or the geographic
source of income, and the relation of these activities to the so-called "manu-
facturing assets." In the case of ITT, the FTC statistics commit an error of
almost one for one - or 100 percent - by including ITT's worldwide manu-
facturing and service activities in this sort of exercise. Similar substantial
errors result with respect to many other large companies, such as mining,
oil, automobile, business machine and other companies with high foreign
growth. One must question the accuracy and meaningfulness of these
statistics when one considers the rapid growth of services and the rapid
growth of overseas activities of all large American companies in recent years.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that the implication of con-
tinually increasing aggregate concentration in a small group of companies
does not follow from the statistics, since the list of 100 or 200 large companies
keeps changing. It is a mathematical certainty that there will always be 100
largest companies, but it is important to recognize that they are not the
same companies from period to period. This again indicates the conclusive
effects of competition and change. For example, of the 50 largest manu-
facturing corporations in 1947 as tabulated by the Bureau of the Census,
only 25 were among the 50 largest in 1966. Similarly, less than one-third of
the top 100 companies in 1909 remain in that category today. What hap-
pened to the golden names in the other two-thirds? What happened to the
traction companies? What happened to the gas companies? And what hap-
pened to the railroads? The emergence of the aviation and electronics in-
dustries and other new industries would be part of the answer. But I think
the basic answer is in the failure of the managements of these companies
to grow, diversify and change along with the economy, or in other words,
the effect of competition.
Also disregarded by the FTC statistics is the simple fact that with re-
spect to the growth in assets of the 200 largest companies between 1948 and
1968, only about one-fifth of the apparent aggregate increase in such assets
can be ascribed to all large mergers by the 200 largest companies - horizon-
tal, vertical, or conglomerate. Consequently, at least four-fifths of that ap-
parent increase in assets was simply the result of non-merger growth by
traditional horizontal companies. It is obvious that practically nothing sig-
nificant of that apparent increase in assets is attributable to diversification
mergers by the "new conglomerate" companies.
The FTC statistics on aggregate concentration also ignore the very im-
portant fact that about 85 percent of the assets of the top 100 companies in
1968 are accounted for by companies in the fields of chemicals, oil, primary
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metals, fabricated metals, machinery, electrical equipment, automobiles and
aircraft. These are all highly capital-intensive manufacturing operations;
thus, perhaps all the FTC statistics on the assets of the top 100 campanies
really tell us is something of the increasing capital costs of heavy goods
industries, of off-shore drilling and, of foreign oil investment, and of the
growth of the automobile and airplane industries.
It is clear that ITT's diversification acquisitions do not pose any threat
of aggregate concentration of United States manufacturing assets. Although
Fortune, and presumably the FTC, rank us as the 11 th largest industrial com-
pany in the United States, about half of our operations are actually located
outside the United States; and a very substantial portion of our activities in
the United States are not in the manufacturing area at all, but are in the
field of services and financial services. For example, ITT has a total of
about 66,000 employees in its manufacturing operations in the United States;
this represents about 0.3 percent of the total number of about 20,045,000
employees on manufacturing payrolls in the United States, according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Consequently, I submit that it is unsound for anyone to suggest that
ITT represents any kind of "aggregate concentration" threat, or indeed,
any other kind of threat to the competitive structure of United States
industry. I believe one could properly ask what the furor over increasing
"aggregate concentration" has to do with conglomerates -or ITT-or
adverse effects on competition? And the answer is clear -almost nothing.
But what are the important stakes for the American citizen and the
national interest? We have agreed that excessive concentration within mar-
kets is not desirable because it may reduce competition, and competition is
what spurs efficiency. We have also shown that diversified mergers do not
increase market concentration but do increase competition. Efficiency is
always desirable, but never more so than today. America's position as a
world industrial leader is challenged today by the resurgent nations of
Europe and Asia, most particularly Germany and Japan. It is more than a
coincidence that the two losing nations of the last world war today lead
in economic enterprise and in growth of world trade. It is more than a
coincidence that the governments of both these countries work very closely
in support of their businessmen- a lesson they learned during the period
of adversity, following the war, in which they rose to their present compet-
itive strengths.
We can win that competitive struggle tomorrow as we did yesterday,
but we must not be hampered with artificial strictures against diversification
or size. We must not be hampered by yesterday's myths when concentrating
on today's needs.
I contend that every year in American industry we can improve pro-
ductivity better than the past average of 2 and 3 percent per annum. But
is even this enough? We must recognize that American salaries and wages
are increasing at twice and three times that rate. We businessmen, almost
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alone, must fill this gapl The gap's other names are inflation, balance of
payments, taxes, and social unrest. We can fill this gap if we continue to
stimulate the competitive drive; but we need the support, not the hin-
drance, of the government to do this.
Without increased efficiency, it is quite conceivable that the industrial
economy of the United States could become second-rate. If we thwart our
companies from growing, changing, and becoming more efficient, even
when their growth has no effect on concentration within markets, we may
be starting on that same downhill road traversed by the traction companies
and the other "golden names" from the past.
American know-how is no longer unique. Our increasing deficits in
the balance of payments area are bluntly telling the cost of this mounting
efficient foreign competition. This same story is being told by the increasing
variety and abundance of imported goods within the country.
Detroit's massive production lines are now matched across the world.
In Asia, we see the Japanese auto industry, with labor rates one-quarter
those of Detroit, rapidly approaching a technologoical level comparable to
our own. We see their products in the United States in increasing use. This
is a trend. We must now meet the challenges implicit in a world awakened
to all of the factors in the economic struggle.
It is not my purpose to object to the flow of foreign competition for
the benefit of the American consumer. It is my purpose to point out the
need for greater efficiency and performance on the part of our domestic
companies, and to point out that better understanding and greater support of
the needs of American business by its government is of vital importance to
the national interest of the United States - and one of those needs is the
ability to diversify and enter new competitive fields.
THE ALLEGATION OF QUESTIONABLE PERFORMANCE
OF ACQUIRED COMPANIES
The recent FTC Report pointed out that it is not possible to measure
efficiency from merger by simple before and after comparisons - since
prices and costs vary over time; there are changes in product development
strategies, capital investment programs, and research and development ex-
penses. 6 There are also important changes in markets, customers, general
economic conditions, inflation, taxes and many other factors. Additionally,
the FTC Report stated that the recent performance of a few conglomerates
indicates that they are not immune from ordinary management problems.'
I would like to make it very clear that we do not claim that our form
of diversified corporate organization, or our form of open management
system, makes ITT immune from ordinary management problems, or any
other kind of economic or business problems. We do not claim that our
management system provides a cure-all for every problem that may arise
6 FTC REPORT at 86.
7 See id. at 103-16.
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within one of our subsidiaries or profit centers. However, I am convinced
from my own 44 years of business experience, and from the experience of
the large number of other experienced and capable corporate executives
who constitute the ITT management team, that the ITT System can pro-
vide the operating units with the maximum assistance that intelligent and
responsible professional management can produce.
Keeping in mind the practical problems I have just noted with respect
to the lack of direct comparability of "before" and "after" profit per-
formance figures, I believe that the companies which have joined the ITT
System have successfully met the problems of drastically increasing labor
and material costs, the problems of higher state, local and federal taxes of
all kinds, and the problems of increasing competitive pressures in every
market we serve, and have generally increased their profits at average
annual rates between 10 and 15 percent per year.8
8 In order to gain a rough idea of the magnitude of these practical business problems,
one must realize that the U.S. Department of Labor has reported an increase of 56.1
percent in average weekly earnings for United States manufacturing workers during the
period from 1958 to 1969, including an increase of 6.1 percent in the last year alonel
The increase for contract construction workers was 80.6 percent during the period from
1958 to 1969, including an increase of 9.8 percent in the last yearl
Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics recently reported that the nation's unit labor
costs have increased by 1.6 percent in the third quarter of 1969, and that the national
productivity has actually decreased in this same period by .4 percent. And, therefore, the
best the United States economy can hope for during the year 1969 is the poorest produc-
tivity increase since 1956.
These increased wage rates are reflected in both our own direct labor costs and in
the costs of all the materials and supplies which we purchase.
For example, the U.S. Department of Labor reports the following substantial in-
creases in the wholesale price index for commonly purchased metals and metal products:
% Increase % Increase
1958-Aug/1969 8/68-8/69
Semi-finished Steel Products 13.3% 5.3%
Gray Iron Castings 30.6% 3.4%
Copper, Wirebar Electrolytic 64.8% 14.6%
Copper Water Tubing (in coils) 51.9% 28.0%
Zinc, Slab, Prime Western 30.0% 7.2%
Red Brass Ingot 76.8% 18.5%
How have ITT's United States operations and manufacturing units coped with this very
serious problem of the cost-price squeeze?
If we take the year 1968, for example, we find that our profit margins have narrowed,
yet we have been able to increase our profits through plain hard work, new plant invest-
ment, and by achieving cost reduction efficiencies in our plants, increased productivity,
increased capacity utilization and increased sales per employee. Vigorous and increasing
competition from both United States and foreign competitors makes it impossible to meet
this squeeze by trying to pass on the entire increase in our own prices; the results of price
increases by United States industry can be seen in increasing imports of foreign steel, autos
and electronic products.
But despite these continual problems of inflation, mounting unit costs, increasing
competition in all markets, and lower margins, despite the specific problems experienced
by any particular ITT profit center along with the other members of their particular
industry, and despite the occasional mistakes which will inevitably be made by any com-
pany, the performance record of the ITT System as a whole would be outstanding by any
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PREDATORY PRICING
I can assure you that, as businessmen, we at ITT do not enjoy losing
money, and we do not intentionally price below our cost. Indeed, the man-
agers in charge of our individual profit centers work hard to reduce their
costs when they see that their competitors are in a position to sell at lower
prices over the long term. I believe that theories that big diversified com-
panies can and will engage in "predatory" pricing, subsidizing one profit
center with the earnings of another in an attempt to monopolize a market,
are folklore - not fact. Such allegations may be numerous, but the evidence
is practically nonexistent. While the businessman who lost a sale on price
would like to think his competition is indulging in sales below cost, I have
found that, in reality, the rival's lower price means that he is more com-
petitive, and that his costs are actually lower.
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Insofar as ITT is concerned, nothing could be further from the truth
than the allegation that the decision-making process is removed from an
acquired company to corporate headquarters. If the decision-making process
were removed from the divisional level, we would be unable to retain the
excellent management we have been able to assemble to operate our various
centers. And it would be impossible to operate them from headquarters.
ITT Headquarters personnel act essentially as an expert management
consultant staff. We do not manage any of the line operations from the
Headquarters in New York City. Our policy is to have each operating unit
do as much of its own work as possible.
The major contribution which ITT brings to the companies which
join the ITT System is the approach and atmosphere of a sound and ef-
fective modern management system. The ITT management system empha-
sizes detailed and realistic short- and long-range planning and budgeting
developed by individual profit centers, effective controls for the ascertain-
ment and measurement of actual performance in comparison to budgeted
performance, prompt ascertainment of problem areas and effective and
prompt constructive and corrective action, and the utilization of an effective
consulting staff to provide advice and assistance in these and other matters,
such as quality measurement and control, cost effectiveness, greater op-
erating efficiencies through industrial, installation, manufacturing and prod-
uct and value engineering, production and inventory control, transportation
and traffic cost control, purchasing techniques, real estate procurement and
comparison over a 10-year period. That record is one of a stable, annually compounded
increase in earnings-per-share at the rate of about 11 percent over each preceding year
for 10 successive years. We believe this 10-year record speaks for itself with respect to the
soundness of our form of diversified corporate organization, as well as our management
systems and techniques. A 10-year summary of this growth would show an increase in
earnings-per-share from 95 cents per share in 1959 to $2.58 per share in 1968 (see Ap-
pendix).
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disposition, technical and R&cD programs, effective control of accounts re-
ceivable, legal, patent and tax advice, personnel recruitment and the many
other aspects of business management where the advice of trained, qualified
and proven professional experts can be of assistance. We encourage and
assist our profit centers in establishing unusually high goals for growth and
profit performance - ordinarily a goal of 15 percent increase in net earnings
each year -but we also assist and support our profit centers in planning
realistic methods and techniques for actually achieving those goals.
ITT could be described as a management cooperative - a group of
small companies, each competing in its own industry and each sharing in
and supporting the cost of a skilled central management it could not afford
alone. We have an "open management" system which 1) stresses flexibility
- continuous fact gathering and analysis, and continuous questioning with
sufficient flexibility to change decisions and directions; 2) stresses com-
munications - including face-to-face communications on the details of prob-
lems, on a continuing basis; 3) is action-oriented, stressing prompt action to
solve business problems; and 4) stresses the early recognition and rapid
development of individual management skills at all levels of the company.
No form of organization can be effective unless it develops and en-
courages the necessary management skills in its executives at all levels, of-
fering them corresponding rewards in career progress and compensation. In
time, such an atmosphere of assistance and high goals encourages the utmost
in hard work and outstanding performance. The wide diversification of
ITT provides great opportunity for individuals to move to positions of
responsibility, to secure recognition for their own contributions, and
to rise in the organization on merit, irrespective of age, seniority, family
connections, or other barriers to achievement that are often associated with
traditional business. For example, the average age of the executives in ITT's
central management group is about 44 years - as compared to a range of
47 to 52 years in most other companies.
Despite, and perhaps even because of our ability to motivate, train
and move able young executives into positions of wide responsibility - and
despite our policy to reward high performance, it has become well known in
industry that ITT constitutes an effective training school for management
executives - and we find that our trained executives are in great demand for
the top management positions in other companies. At least seven corporate
presidents of substantial companies have come from the ranks of ITT exec-
utives in the last few years. While we naturally hate to lose our executives
to other companies, we feel that this substantiates the nature of the cor-
porate executive we are training.
ACCOUNTING TECHNIQUES
Other questions have been raised concerning the accounting techniques
used by diversified companies. Particularly, there is considerable discussion
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of the use of pooling of interest and the amortization of goodwill. Briefly,
this is our position on these subjects.
ITT has not utilized any form of unusual accounting techniques to
enhance its reported earnings. Our acquisitions involving exchanges of stock
have customarily been accounted for as pooling of interests, with no ma-
terial effect on the current reported earnings-per-share of the combined
company; and the principles of pooling permit stockholders and investors
to compare the combined company's current performance with the com-
parable restated earnings of the companies for prior periods, so that there
can be no illusory increase in performance.
Extensive discussions have been carried on within the accounting pro-
fession during recent months with respect to the most desirable techniques
for accounting treatment of mergers and acquisitions. ITT has always fol-
lowed sound and conservative accounting principles, and we shall continue
to do so.
We believe that the business future of ITT is dependent upon the
utilization of good management techniques and established business princi-
ples, as well as the sound use of available capital resources in order to de-
velop a strong and continuing stream of earnings in growth industries. It
is obvious that this type of sound business growth can not be constructed
out of other than sound accounting techniques. We believe that merger
accounting principles should be neither pro-merger nor anti-merger, but
should simply endeavor to reflect as dearly as possible for stockholders and
the investing community the effect of a combination of two earnings
streams and two sets of economic values. Further, we regard the pooling of
interest principles as a convenient and accurate method of accounting for
business mergers. And finally, we believe that reasonable provisions can be
established by the accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange
Commission to eliminate any accounting abuses or deficiencies which may
exist, and that the entire business community will support efforts in that
direction. It should be noted, however, that there have been no such prob-
lems in the diversification mergers made by ITT.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I would like to reiterate that a highly diversified company
- like ITT - produces a beneficial impact on the United States economy.
Companies like ours contribute directly to economic strength by checking in-
flation, by decreasing costs through more efficient production, by stabilizing
employment, by increasing the financial strength of local communities, and
by insuring a fair return to the investors.
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